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THE FEAR OF DISEASE AS A
COMPENSABLE INJURY: AN ANALYSIS
OF CLAIMS BASED ON AIDS PHOBIA
INTRODUCTION
The premise that an individual is entitled to be free from
mental disturbance1  has led to the recognition of fear as a
debilitating emotional injury worthy of legal redress.2 Historically,
courts had been reluctant to acknowledge a right to emotional
tranquility.3 More recently, however, mental suffering has been
recognized as a harm commensurate with physical injury4 and is
See PETER V. HUBER, LIABILITY 116 (1988). This idea dates as far back as the seventh
century when tort damages were established by statute in England, and the "courts con-
sider[ed] some claims for hurt feelings." Id. The policy behind such a right was to "en-
courage recourse to the courts instead of retaliation." Id. By the middle of the 19th century,
the majority of American courts firmly supported this type of legal right. Id.; see also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 359-60 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing reluctant recognition of mental disturbance of cognizable harm); 3 J.D.
LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW, LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 32.01, at 123 (Rev.
ed. 1990) (noting that initial mental suffering recoveries were for "fright").
2 See JAcoB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 3:4, at 63 (2d ed. 1991).
Fear may be recoverable under the terms fright or anxiety. Id. "By definition, fright is a
sudden alarm .... Usually, fright is not of long duration; but while it lasts, it is a feeling
which may be of great intensity .... [It] often has demonstrable and measurable effects on
human beings." Id. § 3:5, at 64. Writing on anxiety, Stein states that "the dread of future
consequences may be a real and sometimes disabling fact." Id. § 3:11, at 74-75.
3 See HUBER, supra note 1, at 116. Among the original reasons for this judicial reluc-
tance was the concern over feigned or exaggerated injury and the belief that even if mental
disturbance could be proved, it was difficult to measure. Id. Another perceived problem was
potential proliferation of lawsuits arising from a single accident. Id. at 117; see also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 360 ("vast increase in litigation"). Professor Keeton observes
that:
There are at least three principal concerns, however, that continue to foster judi-
cial caution and doctrinal limitations on recovery for emotional distress: (1) the
problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often temporary and rela-
tively trivial; (2) the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or
imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportion-
ate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for
consequences which appear remote from the "wrongful" act.
Id. at 360-61. Though these concerns must be met, it is possible for the courts to separate
valid claims from unmeritable ones, and "it is not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases
because some claims may be false." Id. at 361.
4 HUBER, supra note 1, at 117 ("[T]he law recognized that psychic injuries can be real
and that in principle they deserve redress like any others."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
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now a proper basis for a recovery of damages in tort.' Within this
category of torts, courts have recognized the fear of developing a
disease6 as a compensable harm.' The newest branch of disease-
phobia cases is the fear of contracting AIDS.8 Until recently, courts
refused to recognize such an action because both exposure and the
likelihood of developing the disease were inadequately estab-
lished.' In Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.,10
however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia permit-
ted recovery for the fear of developing AIDS," and in so doing,
extended this theory of liability to circumstances in which there
was virtually no chance that the plaintiff would ever develop the
disease. 2 It is submitted that the result reached in Johnson was
erroneous, and it is urged that courts base their decisions on the
available medical data rather than sentiment.
This Note will explore the emerging case law discussing the
fear of AIDS and will examine how the developing standards have
led to an expansion in the elements of recovery. Part I will review
the different contexts in which a claim for mental disturbance may
be brought. Part II will review the law on emotional distress dam-
ages as related to the fear of disease. Part III will unravel the re-
cent decisions in search of clear standards. Finally, Part IV will
§ 54, at 360 ("Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no
less a real injury, than 'physical' pain .... ).
5 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205-07 (6th Cir. 1988)
(class action for fear of contracting liver and kidney disease and cancer due to defendant
corporation's dumping of hazardous chemicals in water supply); Wisniewski v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1985) (fear of contracting cancer due to alleged
asbestos exposure); Kohn v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 568, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding
army liable to kin for distress caused by cremation in derogation of family's religious be-
liefs), af'd, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp.
1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (fear of developing cancer resulting from exposure in utero to
diethylstilbestrol (DES)); Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 660
P.2d 1168, 1176 (Cal.) (holding that parents who watched children drown may recover for
emotional distress), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
6 See, e.g., Warner v. Chamberlain, 30 A. 638, 639 (Del. Super. Ct. 1884) (fear of hydro-
phobia due to dog bite); Anderson v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc., 304 So.2d 351, 353 (La.
1974) (fear of cancer stemming from radiation burns); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (fear of disease due to contamination of household water
with toxic chemicals).
See STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:13.
8 See infra notes 98-175 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
n Id. at 894; see also infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson).
12 See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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propose a method by which the courts can adjudicate such claims
in a way that both promotes uniformity and discourages frivolous
actions.
I. TORT LIABILITY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
The right to recover damages for mental anguish caused by
the fear of developing a disease has consistently been recognized
by our courts.13 Underlying early decisions was the notion that
compensation for mental distress was simply one of the types of
damages recoverable in a personal injury action.14 Such damages
included the fear of developing a condition in the future, if such
fear was an immediate and necessary consequence of the plaintiff's
injury.15
A. Damages For Mental Anguish in a Personal Injury Action
Courts recognize that the majority of personal injuries result
in some degree of physical pain and accompanying mental suffer-
ing.'" The mental suffering encompasses not only the emotional or
psychological response associated with the physical pain, but also
13 See, e.g., Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645, 648 (Conn. 1947) (permitting jury to consider
plaintiff's anxiety over developing epilepsy in future as part of plaintiff's damage award);
Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885, 886 (N.C. 1912) (finding that plaintiff's
mental suffering over fear of developing cancer from his physical injury was compensable);
Trinity & S. Ry. v. O'Brien, 46 S.W. 389, 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) ("mental suffering re-
sulting proximately from the bite of the dog formed an element of damage").
14 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 32.02, at 125-26 ("Simply stated, recovery for emo-
tional disturbance ... is possible because there is a cause of action based on the violation of
a legal right for which other damages were recoverable."). In addition to personal injury,
damages for mental suffering can also be sought in "actions for assault and battery, actions
for injury to property, or actions for interference with the use and enjoyment of land." Id. at
126.
," See, e.g., Warner v. Chamberlain, 30 A. 638, 639 (Del. Super. Ct. 1884) (holding that
plaintiff bitten by dog may recover damages that "necessarily arose" from such injury, in-
cluding "fear and apprehension of hydrophobia"); Alley, 74 S.E. at 886 (affirming rule that
plaintiff may recover for his fear of cancer, if it is "immediate and necessary consequence"
of injury).
16 See EDWARD C. MARTIN, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.1 (1990).
Physical pain is the body's physiological response to injury. Id. at 87. "The actual sensory
feeling of pain is caused by the stimulation of specialized nerve endings in the body which,
through a series of complex biochemical reactions, transmit a signal that the brain inter-
prets as pain." Id. (emphasis omitted). Mental suffering, on the other hand, is a psychologi-
cal or emotional reaction, as opposed to physiological, which results due to a person's sensa-
tion of physical pain. Id. at 87-88. Though physical pain and mental suffering often occur
concurrently, they sometimes do not. Id. at 88. For example a paralyzed individual who
cannot feel any physical pain may suffer from mental anguish due to his condition. Id.
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the response to the potential repercussions of the injury.17 There-
fore, damages for mental distress include both the pain and suffer-
ing that arose prior to trial, and the pain and suffering that may
reasonably develop subsequent to trial.'
There are many emotional reactions generally embraced by
the term mental anguish,'9 including fright,20 shock,2' neurosis,
22
anxiety,23 embarrassment,24 and fear. 5 In many of these categories,
" See STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:2, at 59-60 ("Mental anguish, for which recovery is
sought in personal injury actions, is generally considered as pain and suffering, covering not
only the pain associated with the injury but also the mental reaction to that pain and to the
possible consequences of the injury.").
"s STEIN, supra note 2, at 60; see also MARTIN, supra note 16, § 6.3 at 90 (stating that
future physical pain includes both physical and mental suffering that injured party may
reasonably anticipate to encounter in future).
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j. (1965). "Emotional distress . . . in-
cludes all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humilia-
tion, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea." Id. at 77; see also
STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:4, at 63 (enumerating types of mental anguish).
20 See Brown v. Crawford, 177 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1944) (stating general rule allows recov-
ery for "mental suffering resulting from fright caused by the willful wrong of another");
Butler v. Pardue, 415 So.2d 249, 252 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that fright, fear, or mental
anguish occurring during an ordeal is legally compensable); LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d
228, 234 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (approving jury instructions that severe emotional distress
means any highly unpleasant mental reaction, including fright).
21 See Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368-69 (Tex. 1987)
(explaining that mental anguish includes "shock and emotional trauma"). Cf. Belt v. Saint
Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 195 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1952) (holding that plaintiff's increased
shock was not mere mental disturbance, but rather a compensable physical injury); Vanoni
v. Western Airlines, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding severe shock suf-
fered by plaintiffs constituted physical injury because "a shock to the nervous system is an
injury to the body rather than to the mind") (emphasis omitted).
22 See Coco v. Richland Gen. Contractors, Inc., 411 So.2d 1260, 1262-63 (La. Ct. App.
1982) (stating that damages for traumatic neurosis could be recoverable as part of pain and
suffering but medical expertise in psychiatric field is needed to establish plaintiff's condi-
tion), cert. denied, 413 So.2d 909 (La. 1982); Richard v. Guillory, 392 So.2d 777, 781 (La. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that plaintiff who suffered from depressive neurosis due to auto acci-
dent could recover $10,000 in general damages for mental injury).
21 See Grubbs v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 536, 542 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (noting that
mental anxiety may be considered in estimating damages that naturally result from personal
injuries); Aretz v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397, 402 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (explaining that
"[a]nxiety or worry proximately attributable to an injury is recoverable"), afl'd, 604 F.2d
417 (5th Cir. 1979); Posey County v. Chamness, 438 N.E.2d 1041, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding anxiety part of damages for pain and suffering).
24 See McDonald v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 935, 971 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (noting that individual's humiliation is recoverable as part of damages for
pain and suffering); Wilson v. Redken Labs, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 633, 636-37 (Ky. 1978) (hold-
ing that award of $30,000 for damages for mental anguish suffered due to plaintiff's embar-
rassment over loss of hair was not excessive); Edwards v. Engen, 178 N.W.2d 731, 734
(Minn. 1970) (holding that jury may consider embarrassment or emotional distress plaintiff
was reasonably certain to experience in future, as part of recoverable damages).
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a party may recover even if the feared injury does not occur.26 "For
example, an expectant mother may recover damages for the mental
anguish she undergoes in contemplation of the possibility of mis-
carriage or injury to her unborn child, even though shortly after-
wards, the child is in fact born uninjured. ' ' 27 Although some courts
continue to handle fear of disease claims in this manner,2s other
courts have analyzed such claims as independent actions for emo-
tional distress.29 Courts that have proceeded down this latter path
have done so with much caution, 30 troubled by the issue of whether
emotional distress, standing alone, should support a recovery of
damages.-" Amidst the uncertainty of such a common, yet elusive
injury,32 no general agreement has been reached by the courts as to
what guidelines should govern.33
B. Damages for the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As an independent basis of tort liability, the intentional inflic-
22 See STEIN supra note 2, §§ 3:12-:15. In addition to the fear of developing a future
disease, one may recover for the fear of developing a future disability, the fear of future
surgery, the fear of injury to an unborn child, and the fear of future economic loss. Id.
2 STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:4, at 63-64.
27 STEIN, supra note 2, at 64.
25 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988)
("Mental anguish resulting from the chance that an existing injury will lead to the material-
ization of a future disease may be an element of recovery .... "); Adams v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 592-93 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing Louisiana case law allowing
damages for present mental anguish arising from fear of future disease, caused by physical
injury proven to exist); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 22, 152 N.E.2d 249, 253, 176
N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (1958) (affirming damage award in medical malpractice case, including
$15,000 for mental anguish over fear of developing cancer).
29 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1985) (dis-
missing independent claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon fear of
future illness but finding valid cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
without accompanying physical injury); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp.
1563, 1569 (D. Haw. 1990) (stating that plaintiff's fear of cancer gives rise to independent
cause of action in negligence); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434
(Tenn. 1982) (upholding plaintiff's recovery for fear of future condition based on claim for
negligent infliction of mental anguish).
'1 See In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986). Courts have feared that
such an independent cause of action for emotional distress would open the floodgates to
litigation. Id.
"' See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 361 ("[T]he courts continue to struggle in
defining the limits of liability for negligently inflicted emotional harm."); STEIN, supra note
2 § 3:1, at 57 (noting that "courts disagree on the issue of whether mental anguish, standing
alone, supports a recovery of damages").
22 STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:1.
KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 359-60.
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tion of emotional distress is based on the notion that the "freedom
from emotional disturbance [is] an interest worthy of protection in
its own right.' " 4 However, due to the vagueness of these claims,38
the propensity for their abuse,3 6 and their potential to vastly in-
crease litigation,3 7 the law has placed limitations on this cause of
action.' Most jurisdictions require proof of four elements to estab-
lish intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 9 They are: (1) ex-
treme and outrageous behavior by the defendant40 that (2) is either
intentional or reckless;4' (3) extreme and severe emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff;42 and (4) a causal connection between the
defendant's act and the plaintiff's anguish.43 Although this cause of
3' See TERRANCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE 90'S § 2.1, at 67
(1990).
11 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 12 at 55 (noting criticism of purported mental
anguish injuries as "evanescent, intangible and peculiar").
11 KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 56. Professor Keeton observes that the objection to
the acceptance of the mental anguish cause of action as leading to "fictitious claims [and]
litigation in the field of trivialities and mere bad manners" is well-founded. Id.
37 Id.
"I See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 45-75 and accom-
panying text (discussing cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
9 KIELY, supra note 34, § 2.2, at 68; see also STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:21, at 102.
40 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); see also Lekich v. Interna-
tional Business Mach. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (stating conduct must be
so outrageous and extreme as to surpass bounds of decency in civilized society); cf. Brad-
shaw v. Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511, 514 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (holding mere insults were insuffi-
cient to support claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). But see Goldfarb v.
Baker, 547 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1977) (noting that conduct may be excused if resulting
from annoyance or stress).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. i (1965); see also Thomas v. Douglas,
877 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's refusal to transfer plaintiff-
deputy to another substation despite his whistle-blowing activities was not done intention-
ally or in reckless disregard of the certainty that such emotional distress would occur);
Ridgewells Caterer, Inc. v. Nelson, 688 F. Supp. 760, 764 (D.D.C. 1988) (stating that under
District of Columbia law, it is possible to infer intent or recklessness from defendant's out-
rageous conduct).
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j. (1965); see also Girard v. Ball, 178
Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (defining severe emotional disturbance as distress
that "no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure"); Harris v.
Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 617 (Md. 1977) (holding that plaintiff who was teased by co-worker
because of stutter did not state cause of action in intentional infliction of emotional distress
because defendant's conduct was not shown to be severe); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Wash. 1977) (reversing dismissal of cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress based on plaintiff's heightened susceptibility to dis-
tress caused by ethnic background).
"' See Reed v. Linn County, 425 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (finding actual
proximate causation to be element of claim); Robert v. Saylor, 637 P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan.
1981) (noting need for "causal connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
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action may compensate individuals for their mental suffering, it
has been narrowly interpreted and is extremely difficult to
establish."
C. Damages for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
An independent action for emotional distress may also arise
when the defendant is charged solely with negligence. 45 Courts,
however, have been even more reluctant to find liability on this
basis.46 Whereas a recovery in intentional tort seeks to compensate
and punish a defendant's conduct,47 a negligence claim merely
looks to compensate a plaintiff for injuries caused by a defendant's
lack of due care.48
Various theories have been established that attempt to place
limitations on this type of claim.49 Initially, a majority of courts
permitted recovery for emotional injuries when there was some
type of contemporaneous physical impact.50 Under this approach,
the occurrence of physical impact created a presumption that emo-
tional distress would ensue, thereby guaranteeing the validity of
the plaintiff's claim.51 Furthermore, even though courts recognized
mental distress").
" See STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:21, at 102 (stating that "[1liability is sharply limited to
cases of particularly egregious behavior; the tort is construed very narrowly, and it is a very
difficult tort to prove").
41 See, e.g., Lacy v. Cooper Hosp./Univ. Medical Ctr., 745 F. Supp. 1029 (D.N.J. 1990).
In order to recover under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff
must establish that defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, defendant breached that duty,
and the plaintiff was injured as a result of defendant's breach. Id. at 1035.
46 STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:22, at 112.
47KIELY, supra note 34, § 3.1, at 110.
48 See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 30, at 164 (explaining breach of duty
element of negligence claim).
'8 See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Bodine v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 912 F.2d 1373, 1376 (11th
Cir. 1990) (stating Florida's general rule requiring physical impact upon claimant before
recovery may be had for negligent infliction of emotional distress), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1105 (1991); Quitmeyer v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 740 F. Supp. 363, 368 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (reciting Pennsylvania law as requiring physical impact); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co.,
604 F. Supp. 229, 236-37 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (discussing general rule in Indiana that "damages
for emotional distress are recoverable only when accompanied by and resulting from physi-
cal injury").
"1 See KEErON ET AL., supra note 1, § 54, at 363; see also Bodine, 912 F.2d at 1376
(adopting district court's reasoning that impact rule supplies court with proof that emo-
tional distress has actually occurred); Saechao v. Matsakoun, 717 P.2d 165, 169 (Or. Ct.
App. 1986) (adopting impact rule because it provides court with clear link between compen-
sability and victimization of plaintiff due to defendant's breach).
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the impact requirement as being met when there was inconsequen-
tial contact,52 the absence of any such impact often precluded re-
covery." Eventually, however, it became apparent that, in many
cases, the establishment of a physical impact bore no relationship
to the emotional distress allegedly suffered by the plaintiff. Gradu-
ally, a majority of courts abandoned the impact rule54 and began to
implement the "zone of danger" rule.5
Under the zone of danger approach, only a plaintiff who was
endangered by the defendant's conduct 56 and in reasonable fear of
injury57 could recover. Although this method may be broader in its
52 See, e.g., McGee v. Vanover, 147 S.W. 742, 745 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912) (satisfying impact
requirement with inadvertent brushing against plaintiff); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.,
63 A. 860, 860 (N.J. 1906) (holding impact requirement satisfied from speck of dust in eye);
Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (holding that jostling of passen-
gers in car crash satisfied physical impact requirement); Colla v. Mandella, 85 N.W.2d 345,
347 (Wis. 1957) (stating that minority of courts that still require physical impact will go to
absurd lengths to fulfill standard).
:3 KIELY, supra note 34, § 3.1, at 110.
' See Jeannelle v. Thompson Medical Co., 613 F. Supp. 346, 348 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (stat-
ing that Missouri law recognizes claim of emotional distress without physical impact);
Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 217-19 (Va. 1973). Research indicates that at least 25 out
of 35 jurisdictions that have considered the impact rule have either rejected or abandoned
it. Id. at 219. The reasons for this sweeping change are: (1) medical science has reduced the
difficulties of linking an injury to its subsequent distress; (2) the recognition that the possi-
bility of fraudulent claims should not preclude legitimate ones from recovery; and (3) the
fear of increased litigation, which has not been proved to occur, is insufficient to deny com-
pensation. Id. at 218-19.
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965). The Restatement sets out the
rule as follows:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject
to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk
of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril
of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it
were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm
of another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril
to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an un-
reasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.
Id.
56 See, e.g., Levit v. General Motors Corp., 682 F. Supp. 386, 387 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (deny-
ing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from household fire since
plaintiffs were not home at time of fire and therefore not within zone of danger); Kimelman
v. City of Colorado Springs, 775 P.2d 51, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (finding plaintiffs who
witnessed family member's casket falling headlong into grave could not recover under the-
ory of negligent infliction of emotional distress because they were not in zone of danger),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 (1989).
" See Gillman v. Burlington N. R.R., 878 F.2d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming
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scope,58 it still suffers from many of the deficiencies of the impact
rule.59 Trivial differences in otherwise similar cases operate to
grant recovery in one case, and yet deny recovery in another.6 0
Therefore, though both the impact and the zone of danger rules
have the desired effect of curtailing excess litigation, they often set
mechanical and unjust limitations on recovery.6 1
A third approach adopted by the courts is known as the fore-
seeability rule62 or the "Dillon" rule.63 This approach holds the de-
fendant liable if the plaintiff's emotional distress was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the injury. 4 Courts
apply this method on a case by case basis, 5 relying on three fac-
tors to determine foreseeability:66 (1) the plaintiff's proximity to
the accident; 7 (2) whether the plaintiff witnessed the accident first
hand, as opposed to learning about it from others; 8 and (3) the
relationship between the plaintiff and the victim of the physical
dismissal of cause of action when plaintiff failed to allege that he "felt any contemporaneous
fear for his safety").
5 See STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:24, at 117. Under the zone of danger rule, plaintiff only
has to show risk of physical impact, not actual physical impact. Id.
9 KMELY, supra note 34, § 3:1, at 111.
10 KIELY, supra note 34, § 3:1, at 111; see also Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 780
(Utah 1988) (stating that "the parent standing next to the child who is hit by a car has a
cause of action; the parent standing 20 feet away does not").
KELY, supra note 34, § 3.1, at 111.
52 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 32.13.
63 See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). In Dillon, the California Supreme Court
held that a mother may recover for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of witness-
ing the negligently caused death of her daughter, even though the mother herself suffered
no physical impact and was not within the zone of danger. Id. at 921. In rejecting the zone
of danger rule, the court reasoned that it was anomalous to deny compensation to the
mother, but allow recovery to a sister who happened to be a few yards closer to the accident.
Id. at 915. In granting recovery, "California [became] the first jurisdiction in the United
States to extend liability beyond the zone of danger." Johnson, 763 P.2d at 771, 780.
64 Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919-20. In Dillon, the mother's distress was held to be reasonably
foreseeable because a "negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may reasona-
bly expect that the mother will not be far distant and will, upon witnessing the accident,
suffer emotional trauma." Id. at 921. The court observed that there are two types of foresee-
able risk. Id. at 920. One is the risk of actual physical impact, and the other is the risk of
fright or shock so severe that it causes substantial injury in an ordinary person. Id. The risk
factor applicable in Dillon was of the second type. Id.
15 Id. The court was reluctant to predetermine a defendant's liability in every situation
and instead offered guidelines to help determine whether an ordinary man under such cir-
cumstances should reasonably have foreseen the injury. Id.
66 Id.
"7 Id. In Dillon, the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident when it occurred. Id. at
914.
'" Id. In Dillon, the plaintiff had personally witnessed the accident. Id. at 914.
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injury. 9 Unfortunately, even under the Dillon approach, courts
have frequently produced arbitrary results due to their strict appli-
cation of the three guidelines.70
Some jurisdictions have rejected these rigid criteria altogether
and have recognized a cause of action for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress even in cases in which bodily harm is not
threatened.71 Under this theory, a plaintiff could recover for severe
emotional distress 72 that was the proximate and foreseeable result
of the defendant's negligence. 3 Though this method may reflect a
growing trend among the courts,7 a majority of jurisdictions still
09 Id. The plaintiff in Dillon was the victim's mother and therefore was closely related
to the decedent. Id.
70 KIELY, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 112; see Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989)
(en banc). In Thing, the plaintiff-mother was denied recovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress she allegedly suffered upon arrival at the scene of a car accident where
her son was injured. Id. at 830. The court held that since she did not witness the accident,
she could not recover damages. Id. Under such circumstances, the court concluded that a
plaintiff may recover only if the plaintiff is closely related to the injured party, the plaintiff
is present at the scene when injury occurs, is aware that such related party is being injured,
and the plaintiff subsequently suffers serious emotional distress. Id. at 829-30. In addition,
some courts have limited recovery under the Dillon factors to those cases involving close
familial relationships. See Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 197 Cal Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
In Trapp, two children under the age of 14 witnessed their first cousin drown in a swimming
pool that was allegedly negligently maintained. Id. at 411. The plaintiffs alleged that they
had a very close emotional relationship with the decedent and that they played together
often. Id. Applying the Dillon criteria, the court held that the first cousins could not recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law. Id. at 412. The court found
no reason to extend reasonable foreseeability to include first cousins and instead chose to
limit such standard to the immediate family. Id.; see also Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521,
526-27 (N.J. 1980) (stating existence of marital or intimate family relationship is necessary
element in negligent infliction of emotional distress claim).
71 STEIN, supra note 2, § 3:25, at 118-19.
72 See Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio 1983). Serious emotional distress
does not include trivial mental disturbances or mere hurt feelings. Id. Rather, it signifies
distress with which a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope. Id.;
see also Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990). Severe emotional distress
means any type of disabling mental condition that may be recognized and diagnosed by a
trained professional. Id. at 97. Examples are "neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, [or]
phobia." Id.
73 See, e.g., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (D. Haw. 1990)
(limiting claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress to actions which forseeably in-
flict serious emotional distress, as determined by a reasonable person standard); Dempsey v.
National Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927, 930 (D. Me. 1988) (holding defendant-tabloid could
not reasonably have foreseen probability that publication would cause plaintiff severe emo-
tional distress).
" See Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 764-65 (following line of cases that reject physical injury
requirement); see also Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16, 23 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1988) (stating modern trend is to abandon physical injury requirement).
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require the plaintiff to show some manifestation of the emotional
distress in the form of a physical injury.75
II. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES AND THE FEAR OF DISEASE
Whether the claim for fear of future condition is brought as a
separate action for emotional distress,76 or as part of a personal
injury suit,7 7 all courts require certain elements.78 First, a plaintiff
must prove exposure to the disease-causing agent. 9 Second, the
plaintiff's fear of developing the future condition must be reasona-
ble.80 Though this latter requirement is generally a question for the
trier of fact,81 the courts have established some guidelines for de-
termining what may be deemed reasonable in an appropriate
case.
82
Although the standards for determining what may constitute
reasonable fear vary by jurisdiction, many jurisdictions hold that
the fear of developing a future disease may be reasonable even
71 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 32.11, at 152; Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions For
Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1992); see also Wilson
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 757 F.2d 948, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding posttraumatic
stress disorder suffered by plaintiffs insufficient to satisfy physical injury requirement), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 716-17 (D.
Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law requiring physical injury in negligence based claims);
Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 42-43 (Idaho 1990) (stating Idaho law re-
quires emotional distress accompanied by physical injury or physical manifestations of in-
jury); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894, 896-97 (R.I. 1988) (adhering to majority rule
requiring physical injury).
70 See supra notes 34-75 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Harper v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (holding evidence of exposure to toxic materials insufficient proof of mental anguish
over fear of future disease); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986) (stating
plaintiff must establish fear of disease as proximately caused by exposure to agent).
80 See, e.g., Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16833,
at *162 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (stating that anxiety must be reasonable in claims for
emotional distress over fear of future disease); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d
495, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that to recover for alleged fear, plaintiffs must
prove fear of developing cancer from exposure to asbestos reasonable); Rittenhouse v. Saint
Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 565 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (dismissing plaintiff's
emotional distress claim for fear of cancer because anxiety unreasonable), rev'd on other
grounds, 579 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1992).
81 See Lavelle v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1987) (explaining that fact-finder must conclude claim for increased fear of cancer was
reasonable).
82 See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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when the actual likelihood of developing the disease is minimal.8 3
These jurisdictions, however, still require a reasonable connection
between the fear and the prospect of future illness.8 4 That the
feared condition is not likely to occur is relevant only in terms of
the jury's determination of the claim's reasonableness", and the
amount of compensation awarded the plaintiff.86
A minority of jurisdictions take the opposite approach and re-
quire that the feared condition be reasonably certain to occur 7 or
that there be an increased statistical likelihood of its occurrence.88
Under this analysis, the mere possibility of future harm is inade-
quate; 9 the plaintiff is required to make some threshold showing
of the possibility of developing the feared condition.90
In addition, many jurisdictions demand proof of a functional
impairment91 or a medically identifiable effect92 caused by the ex-
83 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988) (ex-
plaining how mental anguish resulting from fear of future disease may be compensable even
though feared condition not likely to develop); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456,
467 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that under Texas law, damages for mental anguish arising from
fear of developing future disease are compensable even though disease not medically proba-
ble), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp.
1553, 1559-60 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (deciding that only "reasonable certainty" is required, rather
than "reasonable fear").
" See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1206 (stating mental distress damages normally not granted
where connection between fear and plaintiff's injury too tenuous); Wetherill, 565 F. Supp. at
1560 (noting requirement of causal link between fear of future illness and physical impact).
88 See Dartez, 765 F.2d at 468.
88 See id.
See Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D.S.C. 1987). Under
South Carolina law, a plaintiff can recover for mental anguish and severe emotional distress
in three situations: (1) when the plaintiff can prove pain and suffering resulting in a physical
injury provided the feared condition is reasonably certain to occur; (2) when extreme dis-
tress is caused by "outrageous" behavior; and (3) when a bystander witnesses a traumatic
event. Id.; see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.) (allowing
recovery for mental distress when pain and suffering result from defendant's gross miscon-
duct), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
88 See Kosmacek v. Farm Serv. Co-op. of Persia, 485 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992) (reversing judgment for fear of future disease due to plaintiffs' failure to establish
increased statistical likelihood of getting cancer); Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
507 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1987) (stating that plaintiff must possess increased sta-
tistical likelihood of developing cancer in order to recover for fear of cancer).
88 See Kosmacek, 485 N.W.2d at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
9' See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-70 (D. Haw. 1990)
(explaining fear over future disease cannot be reasonable absent knowledge of functional
impairment).
82 See Rittenhouse v. Saint Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 565 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (Sup. Ct.
1990) (stating in nationwide asbestos litigation, courts allow recovery for fear of cancer when
there is rational basis for such fear, i.e. clinical presence of asbestos fibers in lung), rev'd on
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posure to the disease-causing agent. The policy underlying this re-
quirement is that a reasonable person would not fear a future con-
dition without some concrete evidence,93 i.e., some medical
indication of exposure to the disease-causing agent.94
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON THE FEAR OF AIDS
Since the first case descriptions of AIDS in 1981,91 this fatal
disease96 has become the highest public health priority in the na-
tion.97 Additionally, claims based on the fear of developing AIDS
("AIDS phobia") have become more prevalent.9
other grounds, 579 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1992); Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471
A.2d 493, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (concluding that claims for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress require proof of some medically identifiable effect resulting from plaintiff's
exposure); cf. Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing plaintiff's failure to establish physical evidence of asbestos-related condition precluded
recovery for fear of cancer despite years of exposure).
93 See, e.g., Hawaii Fed. Asbestos, 734 F. Supp. at 1567-70 (explaining that functional
impairment provides court with objective evidence of connection); Rittenhouse, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 367-68 (dismissing plaintiff's action for fear of cancer because no connection
between fear and exposure was established).
" See Hawaii Fed. Asbestos, 734 F. Supp. at 1569-70; Rittenhouse, 565 N.Y.S.2d at
367.
'" See The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 357 (June 7, 1991) [hereinafter AIDS Epidemic]. The first cases of AIDS were
reported by health-care providers in California and the Centers for Disease Control. Id. By
the end of 1981, there were 189 cases reported from 15 states and the District of Columbia.
Id. at 358. Over three quarters of these cases were reported from California and New York
alone. Id. The overwhelming majority of cases involved men and none involved children. Id.
By 1990, however, every state had reported AIDS cases, and a growing number of these
cases involved women. Id. Nearly 800 cases involved children less than 13 years old. Id.; see
The Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, June
1981-December 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 28 (Jan. 17, 1992). The num-
ber of AIDS cases reported to the Centers of Disease Control rose to 100,000 by the end of
1989. Id. Two years later in 1991, that number rose to 206,392, while the number of reported
AIDS-related deaths was 133,232. Id. Though most reported AIDS cases involved homosex-
ual or bisexual men, the number of AIDS cases attributable to heterosexual transmission
has increased, thereby increasing the number of cases involving women. Id.
9 See Aids Epidemic, supra note 95, at 357 (estimating that by end of 1991 in United
States AIDS would be second leading cause of death among men aged 25-44 and one of five
leading causes of death among women aged 15-44).
07 See Ralph R. Reed, Preface to AIDS AND THE COURTS xi, xi-xii (Clark C. Abt &
Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990).
" See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court in Castro explained that plaintiff's
claim for "AIDS phobia" is for fear of contracting the disease itself. Id.; see also Ordway v.
Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (discussing when AIDS phobia can be via-
ble mental injury for action based on negligent infliction of emotional distress); Doe v. Doe,
519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599-600 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction
1993]
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A plaintiff suffering from AIDS phobia has allegedly been ex-
posed to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"),9 9 the agent
that causes AIDS,100 and consequently suffers from a" fear of later
developing the disease. As with other disease-phobia claims,1 1 the
plaintiff's fear constitutes a present injury.10 2 In Burk v. Sage
Products, Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania considered a claim based on the emotional
fear of contracting AIDS.0s In Burk, the plaintiff was a paramedic
who, while using a device made by the defendant-manufacturer
designed for the disposal and containment of used medical syr-
inges, was stuck by a needle protruding from the container. 04 The
plaintiff alleged that a number of AIDS patients were seen on the
hospital floor at the time the incident occurred. 1 5 The plaintiff,
however, was unable to prove that the needle was used on an AIDS
of emotional distress based upon AIDS phobia because there was no proof of exposure).
11 See, e.g., Harold Jaffe, The Application of Medical Facts to the Courts, in AIDS AND
THE COURTS, supra note 97, at 7.
"0I See DONALD H.J. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS § 1:07
(1991). A person becomes HIV infected when the virus enters the bloodstream and stimu-
lates the development of antibodies. Id. At the initial stage of HIV infection, many people
develop a "mononucleosis-like" illness. Id. Eventually, almost all of these people will then
enter a stage where they carry the infection, without an overt manifestation of AIDS. Id.;
see also JOHN G. BARTLETT & ANN K. FINKBEINER, THE GUIDE TO LIVING WITH HIV INFEC-
TION 9 (1991). The HIV virus stimulates the gradual weakening of the human immune sys-
tem. Id. An HIV-infected individual usually does not develop any symptoms of infection for
years, or even decades. Id. When these symptoms do begin to appear, it is said that the
individual is suffering from AIDS-related complex, or ARC. Id. The condition turns into
AIDS when the immune system becomes even weaker and infections normally fought off by
the immune system appear. Id.
"' See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir.) (ex-
plaining that plaintiff's claim for cancerphobia is for present anxiety of contracting cancer
in future), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Buck v. Brady, 73 A. 277, 279 (Md. Ct. App.
1909) (stating that plaintiff's damages resulting from hydrophobia was proper matter for
jury consideration); Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1987) (differentiating cancerphobia, or present injury consisting of anxiety over
developing cancer in future, from increased risk of actually contracting cancer in future).
"I See Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that
plaintiff's only injuries arise from his fear after exposure to AIDS); Johnson v. West Va.
Univ. Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 894 (W.Va 1991) (upholding plaintiff's recovery for anxi-
ety, coupled with its physical manifestations, currently suffered due to possibility of devel-
oping AIDS).
103 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
104 Id. at 286. In a personal injury action, plaintiff sought recovery for various ailments
allegedly resulting from his fear of developing AIDS. Id. The plaintiff sought relief on sev-
eral grounds: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Id. The plaintiff also sued
for the deterioration of his marriage, allegedly affected by emotional distress. Id.
'"' Id.
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patient; thus, initial exposure to the disease was not shown." 6 In
analyzing the plaintiff's claim, the district court determined that,
although damages for the fear of contracting a disease after expo-
sure may be compensable,'0 7 damages stemming solely from a fear
that the initial exposure had occurred are not.108 In addition, the
plaintiff repeatedly tested negative for HIV infection more than
one year after the incident. 09 The court found that it is extremely
unlikely that a person who tests HIV-negative more than six
months after exposure to the virus will develop AIDS due to that
exposure." 0 Since the plaintiff could not prove exposure to the
HIV virus, and because it had been medically established that the
plaintiff was virtually guaranteed not to have contracted AIDS
from this particular accident, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.-"
A similar result was reached in Hare v. New York," 2 where an
X-ray technician was bitten by a patient suspected of being in-
fected with AIDS." 3 In affirming the lower court's judgment deny-
ing plaintiff recovery for emotional distress resulting from the fear
100 Id.
107 Id. at 287.
100 Id. Plaintiff did not allege that he had been injured by exposure to the HIV virus,
but instead claimed injury by virtue of exposure to a needle. Id. at 288 n.2. In its analysis,
the court stated that it was unable to find a jurisdiction whose laws permitted recovery for
the fear of developing a disease when exposure to the disease-causing agent had not been
proven. Id. But see Faya v. Estate of Almaraz, Nos. 143, 144, 1993 WL 60500, at *9 (Md.
Mar. 9, 1993) where the Maryland Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' failure to allege
actual transmission of the HIV virus does not preclude their claim of negligence. The court
reasoned that "Burk's requirement that plaintiffs must allege actual transmission would un-
fairly punish them for lacking the requisite information to do so." Id.
"I Id. at 288. The plaintiff had taken five blood tests since the accident, and each test
was negative. Id. at 286, 288. However, the plaintiff still alleged that despite his HIV nega-
tive tests, he "cannot tell if he will contract AIDS in the future." Id. at 288. Despite the
defendant's failure to challenge this contention, the court noted that due to the negative
test results, there was a "high degree of medical certainty" that plaintiff would not develop
AIDS from being stuck by the needle. Id.
110 Id.
... Id. The court stated that Pennsylvania law normally requires as a prerequisite to
recovery for emotional distress, that the distress be accompanied by physical injury. Id. at
286. In this case, the court felt that the plaintiff's loss of all sexual function as a conse-
quence of the needle stick incident, appeared to satisfy this requirement. Id. at 287.
112 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 1991), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 859 (1991).
"I Id. at 126. The patient was a prison inmate who was transferred to Richmond Me-
morial Hospital due to an injury he sustained while attempting to commit suicide. Id. The
following day, the inmate again tried to kill himself by repeatedly stabbing himself with a
fork. Id. The plaintiff, who was working at the hospital, tried to assist a corrections officer in
subduing the inmate and was bitten on the forearm in the process. Id.
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of contracting AIDS," 4 the court relied on the fact that there was
no proof introduced at trial establishing that the patient did in
fact have the disease; 1 5 thus, exposure was uncertain." 6 Further,
on several occasions the plaintiff had tested HIV-negative."17 The
court concluded that due to these two factors, plaintiff's emotional
distress claim was too "remote and speculative""' 8 and relief was
denied." 9
In Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.,20 the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia became one of the first
courts to hold that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress
based on a fear of developing AIDS.' 2' In Johnson, the plaintiff
was bitten by an HIV-infected patient immediately after the pa-
tient had bitten himself.1'22 A deciding factor in Johnson, notably
absent in each of the prior cases,11a was that the plaintiff's expo-
"4 Id. The lower court found that "the State had negligently failed to provide adequate
supervision of the inmate and that the State's negligence constituted a proximate cause of
the claimant's injuries." Id. Though the court denied recovery for the fear of contracting
AIDS, it did grant the plaintiff damages for pain and suffering. Id.
"I Id. The only thing adduced at trial on'whether the inmate had AIDS was the plain-
tiff's testimony regarding a statement made by a nurse at the hospital that the inmate may
have had the disease. Id.
116 Id. "[N]o proof was introduced as to the liklihood of claimant's contracting AIDS
under the circumstances presented." Id. at 127.
117 Id.
... Id. The only other evidence on the topic was that the plaintiff had lost weight and
had cold symptoms following the incident. Id.
119 Id.
120 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
121 Id. at 894.
122 Id. at 891. The plaintiff was a police officer who was called to subdue an unruly
patient at the defendant's hospital. Id. Initially, the plaintiff merely observed the situation,
but when it became apparent that the medical personnel were unable to restrain the pa-
tient, the plaintiff began to assist. Id. In the process, the patient bit the plaintiff on his
forearm. Id. Although the medical personnel knew of the patient's condition, no one had
informed the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant negligently failed
to warn him that the patient had AIDS, and as a result of being bitten, the plaintiff suffered
from emotional distress. Id.
121 See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 286; Hare v. New York, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (App. Div.
1991), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 859 (1991); see also Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 595
(Sup. Ct. 1987). In Doe, the plaintiff sued her husband for, inter alia, the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress based on AIDS phobia. Id. The plaintiff's husband told her that
he had homosexual relations with other men, and the plaintiff alleged that this information
led to her fear of developing AIDS. Id. at 596. However, not only did the plaintiff fail to
take an HIV test, but she also failed to allege that her husband had AIDS or was HIV-
positive. Id. at 599. On granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that
there was no event which it could label the "precipitating action." Id.
Rather than being able to prove exposure, the plaintiff merely feared she may have
been exposed. Id. The court was unwilling to base recovery on such a highly attenuated set
1993] AIDS PHOBIA
sure to the virus was proven.124 However, the plaintiff never tested
positive for the HIV virus. 125 The AIDS phobia cases prior to
Johnson, such as Burk and Hare, relied on two factors in denying
recovery. 2 ' First, the fact that exposure had not been estab-
lished,1 27 and second, the fact that each plaintiff had tested nega-
tive for HIV.128 In addition, in two more recent cases1 29 in which
exposure was uncertain, the HIV-negative status of the plaintiff
was an important consideration in denying recovery. 130 The John-
son court, however, never considered this factor in its analysis. 13'
Since the plaintiff had proven exposure'3 2 and the jury had found
his fear to be reasonable, 133 the court upheld his recovery. 3 4
of facts. Id. at 599-600.
24 Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893. Before the patient bit the plaintiff, he had bitten him-
self on the arm. Id. As a result, the patient's HIV-infected blood was in and around his
mouth when he bit the plaintiff. Id. Further, the bite broke the plaintiff's skin and caused
his arm to bleed. Id. Therefore, it was clear that the plaintiff was exposed to the HIV virus,
and expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff confirmed that to be the case. Id.
125 Id. at 891.
126 See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
127 See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288; Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 126; Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
128 See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288; Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127; Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
12 See Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Funeral
Serv. By Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 82 (W. Va. 1991).
10 See Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1015. In Ordway, the plaintiff was a surgeon who had
operated twice on an HIV-infected patient, unaware of the patient's condition. Id. The
plaintiff claimed that had he known of the patient's status, he would have taken certain
precautions. Id. The plaintiff alleged to be living in fear that he had contracted the HIV
virus. Id. On granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court held that absent any unusual occurrence
during either operation or any indication of legitimacy in plaintiff's postoperative condition,
plaintiff's claim was insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 1017. However, the court also
stressed the fact that the plaintiff had tested negative for HIV. Id.
In Funeral Serv. By Gregory, 413 S.E.2d at 79, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia for a second time ruled on the AIDS phobia issue, only two weeks after deciding
Johnson. In Gregory, the plaintiff was a mortician who embalmed a corpse, unaware that it
was infected with AIDS. Id. at 80. The plaintiff alleged that if he had known of this fact, he
would have taken steps to minimize his exposure. Id. After the exposure he claimed to have
suffered from fear of contracting AIDS. Id. at 81. He had been tested for HIV four times
with negative results. Id. at 82. Relying on Johnson, the court held that if there is no evi-
dence of actual exposure to the virus, the fear is unreasonable, and thereby affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim. Id. at 84. However, the court also stated that
because of plaintiff's HIV-negative status, there was no proof that plaintiff had been in-
fected. Id. at 82.
"' See Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 892-93. Though the court noted that the plaintiff was
not infected, it concentrated more on the plaintiff's fear as displayed through his alleged
sleeplessness, stress, and uncertainty. Id.
22 Id. at 893.
133 Id. at 894.
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It is submitted that the Johnson court failed to consider one
essential factor-the HIV status of the plaintiff. Courts adjudicat-
ing AIDS phobia cases should not rely entirely on guidelines for
recovery based on other fear of disease cases.'3 5 The factor that
distinguishes AIDS phobia cases is that there are reliable and con-
clusive tests to determine whether a person has been infected with
the HIV virus." 6 By contrast, a worker exposed to asbestos cannot
"I Id. The court, however, expressly limited its holding to the facts of Johnson, al-
lowing recovery only if:
[T]he plaintiff is not an employee of the hospital but has a duty to assist hospital
personnel in dealing with a patient infected with AIDS; the plaintiff's fear is rea-
sonable; the AIDS-infected plaintiff physically injures the plaintiff and such phys-
ical injury causes the plaintiff to be exposed to AIDS; and the hospital has failed
to follow a regulation which requires it to warn the plaintiff of the fact that the
patient has AIDS despite the elapse of sufficient time to warn.
Id.
135 See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (basing
decision on Pennsylvania's law on fear of disease); Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893 (basing deci-
sion in part on previous fear of disease cases).
3' See BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 282. The most widely used method
in determining whether or not a person has been infected with the HIV virus is testing for
antibodies to the virus. Id. The body makes antibodies to kill microbes that invade human
tissues. Id. Therefore, if antibodies are present, that means that microbes are, or once were,
present. Id.; see also PAUL H. DOUGLAS & LAURA PINSKY, THE ESSENTIAL AIDS FACTBOOK 44
(1987). Many people mistakenly refer to HIV antibody testing as AIDS testing. Id. Such a
label is incorrect because having HIV antibodies is not dispositive that one has AIDS, or
even that one will develop AIDS in the future. Id. An HIV positive test result means that
the patient has been infected by HIV and is capable of transmitting the virus. Id.; HERMANN
& SCHURGIN, supra note 100, § 8:08 (discussing HIV antibody testing and stating that pre-
sumably all HIV-infected persons can transmit virus).
There are two standard tests used in conjunction with one another for the detection of
antibodies to HIV. See BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 282; DOUGLAS & PINSKY,
supra, at 45; HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 100, §§ 1:31-32, 3:04, 8:08-09, 10:14; Science
Brief: AIDS Test Examined, ECONOMIST, July 2, 1988, at 70 [hereinafter Science Brief]. The
first test is the enzyme-linked immunosorhent assay (ELISA) which indicates that antibo-
dies may possibly be present. See BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 282. To per-
form the ELISA test, HIV is grown, purified, and broken down into its component parts,
which are placed in some type of solid phase. Id. When test serum is added, there will be a
color change if the serum contains antibodies to HIV. Id.; see Science Brief, supra, at 70.
An ELISA test takes between three and eight hours. Id. If an ELISA test does not detect
any antibodies, it is concluded that the blood sample tested was not infected with the virus,
and the test is normally not repeated. Id. However, if the test does detect antibodies, it is
performed at least once but usually twice more. Id.
The second test, the Western Blot, is a validation test used to confirm that the antibo-
dies are indeed present. See BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 282; see also Sci-
ence Brief, supra, at 70. ELISA tests that indicate antibodies to HIV two or three times
consecutively are then tested using the Western Blot method. Id. In the Western Blot test,
the main proteins of a laboratory-grown HIV virus, called antigens, are separated by electri-
cal current and placed onto strips of a special paper. Id. If a blood specimen introduced
does not contain antibodies to HIV, there will be no reaction when the specimen is placed
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take a "cancer test" to determine whether he will develop the dis-
ease as a result.237 Thus, in such cases, the fear may reasonably last
a lifetime since it is impossible to completely rule out future devel-
opment of the feared condition. 38
While Johnson extended the AIDS phobia cause of action to
allow a plaintiff who was clearly HIV-negative to recover, a New
York court went even further, eliminating the need to show expo-
sure to the AIDS virus. In Castro v. New York Life Insurance
Co.,' 39 the plaintiff-cleaning worker was stuck in the thumb with a
used hypodermic needle and syringe found in a waste container.140
Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of
New York County upheld the AIDS phobia claim. M  As in Burk,142
on these strips. Id. However, if the sample does contain HIV, antibodies in the sample will
align with the antigens on the strips Id. Since scientists know which antibodies bind to
which antigens, they are able to identify specific antibodies. Id. Both specimens that are
known to be negative and those that are known to be positive, are tested at the same time as
the sample, to serve as a comparison. Id. The results of the Western Blot test have histori-
cally been controversial. Id. In July of 1989, however, the Centers for Disease Control speci-
fied criteria interpreting the results, which have consequently cleared up any discrepancies
there may have once been. See generally Elaine M. Sloand et al., HIV Testing: State of the
Art, 266 JAMA 2861, 2862 (1991) (stating that up to 70% of ELISA tests are not confirmed
by second ELISA).
Since the Western Blot test detects the different antibodies individually, it is less likely
than the ELISA to react to the wrong antibodies and produce false-positive results. See
Science Brief, supra, at 70. The Western Blot is not used initially, however, because it is
much more expensive, slower, and harder to perform than the ELISA. Id.
Recently, there has been a scare that a new virus may exist that will not test positive on
an HIV antibody test. See Cases of AIDS-Like Illnesses that Test Negative for HIV to Be
Published By CDC; New Virus May Exist, BLUE SHEET No. 35(3):2-3 (1992). There have
been relatively few known cases of AIDS-like illnesses around the world in which the vic-
tims test HIV-negative. However, researchers feel confident that these cases are not exam-
ples of HIV infection. Id. Therefore, these disorders have no impact on the reliability of the
HIV tests. See id.
137 See Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1987) (stating that it cannot be proven that cancer will inevitably follow from asbestosis).
", See supra notes 136-37.
"' 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
140 Id. at 695. The plaintiff, while emptying garbage from a small waste container into a
larger one, pushed down on the garbage and was stuck by the needle. Id. The plaintiff was
working in the normal course of her employment during the incident. Id.
"I Id. at 698. The plaintiff brought two causes of action. Id. at 695. The first claim
alleged that the defendant was negligent, on which the plaintiff based the claim for AIDS
phobia. Id. at 695-96. The second claim alleged that plaintiff's husband, as co-plaintiff, lost
the care, comfort, companionship, and consortium of his wife due to the injuries caused by
the defendant. Id. at 696. The court stated that in order to recover on the negligence claim,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed her a duty, that the defendant subse-
quently breached that duty, that there existed "a reasonably close causal connection be-
tween the breach and the resulting injury, and that the plaintiff suffered actual loss, harm,
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the identity of the contaminator was unknown, 143 and exposure to
the HIV virus was therefore uncertain.' Furthermore, the plain-
tiff was tested for the HIV virus, but refused to reveal the
results. 4 5
In permitting the claim to proceed, the court, citing Ferrara v.
Galluchio,'46 a seminal New York case allowing recovery for can-
cer-phobia, stated that if the claim is tied to a distinct event that
would cause a reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting a
disease such as AIDS, 47 there is a "guarantee of genuineness" of
the claim. 48 The court reasoned that the average person exposed
to all of the information circulating about AIDS, who is stuck by a
used needle and syringe, could develop a fear of contracting the
disease."' Ferrara may be distinguished, however, because in that
case the plaintiff's initial exposure to the agent which caused the
potential for disease was not at issue.150 Further, by permitting
or damage." Id. at 697.
142 Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see supra notes
103-11 and accompanying text (discussing Burk).
14 Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 696. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's employees
were taking blood samples from prospective life insurance applicants and discarding the
used needles and syringes in ordinary disposal containers, in violation of state law. Id. To
support her claim for AIDS phobia, plaintiff brought in proof that she had four sessions
with a psychiatrist after the incident and that the psychiatrist reported that the plaintiff
believed that she would die of AIDS and was consequently unable to return to work. Id. at
697.
14 Id. at 696.
146 Id. Castro contended that Coney Island Hospital sent her for HIV testing which she
continued regularly. Id. The defendant alleged that Castro refused to reveal her test results
at the deposition and that the only evidence presented by Castro that she may develop
AIDS was based on "ignorance and hysteria."Id.
152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958).
147 Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The plaintiff's doctor determined that the plaintiff's
disturbed mental condition was entirely attributable to the needle stick incident. Id. Conse-
quently, the court found that plaintiff's mental anguish was directly tied to that event. Id.
at 698.
146 Id. at 697. The court stressed plaintiff's awareness of the fact that AIDS can be
contracted through HIV contaminated blood. Id. at 698.
" Id. The court relied on what it called a "massive informational campaign waged by
federal, state, and local health officials . . . to educate the public about this dreadful dis-
ease." Id.
150 152 N.E.2d at 250. In Ferrara, the plaintiff suffered an X-ray burn on her shoulder
due to radiation therapy she was receiving from the defendants. Id. This condition was diag-
nosed as chronic radiodermatitis. Id. Approximately two years later, the plaintiff was ad-
vised by a dermatologist to have her shoulder checked every six months because the burn
could become cancerous. Id. at 251. On affirming plaintiff's award for damages for cancer-
phobia, the New York Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff's X-ray burn did not heal
for an unusually long amount of time, that plaintiff's scab lasted for several years resulting
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plaintiff's claim for AIDS phobia to proceed even though exposure
was uncertain, 151 the Castro court completely disregarded the ex-
press warning given by the court in Burk. 52 The Burk court stated
that there had never been a case in any jurisdiction which permit-
ted recovery for emotional distress damages arising out of a fear of
contracting disease when the plaintiff could not prove exposure to
the disease causing agent.153 This result is not surprising; it can
only be imagined how many groundless claims would be allowed
under a standard requiring neither proof of exposure to HIV nor
HIV test results. Many claims will arise in which individuals will
allege "distinct events"'" 4 in which they may have been exposed to
the HIV virus, but are unable to prove it. 55 Though other fear of
disease cases may have relied on the genuineness of the plaintiffs'
claim, 1 exposure was never at issue. 57 There is a substantial dif-
ference between the fear of contracting an illness after exposure to
a disease-causing agent 58 and the fear that an exposure may have
occurred;5 9 the two concepts are distinct and must not be
confused. 60
The distinction was similarly overlooked in Carroll v. Sisters
of Saint Francis Health Services'6' where the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee permitted a claim based on the fear of contracting
AIDS to proceed, even though the plaintiff could not establish ex-
posure to the HIV virus. 6 2 In Carroll, while visiting her sister in
defendant's hospital, the plaintiff stuck three of her fingers on
what appeared to be a towel dispenser, but was actually a contami-
in a section of her skin permanently exhibiting depigmentation and signs of atrophy, the
common knowledge that such wounds frequently become cancerous, and finally the advice
of her dermatologist, all supported plaintiff's claim for mental distress from the fear of de-
veloping cancer. Id. at 252-53. But see id. at 253-54 (Froessel, J., dissenting) (stating that
defendant's liability for plaintiff's injury should not include mental anguish over fear of
condition which may never develop, based upon doctor's statement as to mere possibilities).
151 Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
15' Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
153 Id.
Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
5 See id. at 696 (sustaining claim based merely on possible exposure to HIV).
16 See, e.g., Ferrara, 152 N.E.2d at 250.
See id. at 252.
See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287.
See id. at 287-88.
160 See id.
6I No. 02A01-9110CV00232, 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992), appeal
granted, Feb 22, 1993.
162 Id. at *5.
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nated needle receptacle. 163 Relying on the Tennessee Supreme
Court decision in Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 6 4 the court
held that Tennessee does not require the "strict rules of actual ex-
posure" imposed by -Pennsylvania and West Virginia courts;6 5
rather, the standard is whether the fear is reasonable.16  Based
upon expert testimony presented by the plaintiff stating that used
needles are medically presumed to be capable of transmitting the
HIV virus,'67 the court found that there was a disputed issue of
material fact as to whether plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS was
reasonable.'68 The court did, however, limit the period of mental
anguish to the time from the date of alleged exposure until the fear
becomes unreasonable. 69
In a stern dissent, Judge Highers asserted that the "prevailing
trend and, I believe, the better-reasoned rule, as well as Tennessee
case law, all require" that a plaintiff is precluded from recovery for
the emotional distress caused by the fear of contracting AIDS
when the plaintiff cannot prove exposure to the HIV virus.17 0 The
fact that the plaintiff had tested HIV-negative for nearly three
years after the incident further established the unreasonableness
,63 Id. at *1. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the hospital was negligent in placing the
needle container near the wash basin and in failing to place warnings on it. Id.
164 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982). In Laxton, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover dam-
ages for, inter alia, the mental distress resulting from the alleged negligence of the defend-
ant-exterminating company in contaminating plaintiff's water supply with a toxic chemical.
Id. at 431. The plaintiffs had used the contaminated water for "normal household purposes"
for approximately nine months before finding out about the high level of toxic contamina-
tion. Id. at 432-33. Though the plaintiffs became worried about their health and that of
their children, blood tests taken a month later revealed that they had not been harmed. Id.
at 433. In reinstating the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, the court
stated that "recovery for the negligent infliction of mental anguish should be allowed in
cases where, as a result of a defendant's negligence, a plaintiff has ingested an indefinite
amount of a harmful substance." Id. at 434. However, the court limited the recovery of
mental anguish to the "time between discovery of the ingestion and the negative medical
diagnosis or other information that puts to rest the fear of injury." Id.
165 Carroll, 1992 WL 276717, at *4; see supra notes 103-11, 120-34 and accompanying
text.
166 Carroll, 1992 WL 276717, at *4. The court interpreted Laxton to mean a plaintiff
may recover for mental distress due to the ingestion of a "potentially harmful" substance.
Id.
167 Id. at *4. But see HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 100, § 1:29 (citing studies es-
tablishing risk of infection after needle stick exposure to infected blood is in range of 0.3%
to 0.9%).
168 Carroll, 1992 WL 276717, at *5.
169 Id.
"I Id. (Highers, J., dissenting). Judge Highers also emphasized Burk as support for his
position. Id.
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of the plaintiff's fear. 171 Concerned that the majority's standard
would lead to a floodgate of claims based on unsubstantiated
fears,1"2 Judge Highers stated that proof of actual exposure must
remain an essential prerequisite to recovery.173
In addition to not considering the HIV status of the plain-
tiff,174 the courts in Castro and Carroll unmeritoriously expanded
the guidelines for what may constitute exposure. In order to pre-
vent the saturation of the courts with idle claims based on irra-
tional fears of unproven events, exposure must remain a decisive
element of a plaintiff's fear of disease claim, including one for the
fear of AIDS.'75
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In accord with the decision in Burk,'7 6 one of the most recent
federal cases to deal with this issue, it is submitted that before a
claim for the recovery of damages for the fear of developing AIDS
may proceed, the plaintiff must prove both exposure to the HIV
virus and that the fear was reasonable. Absent either requirement,
the claim should be dismissed as a matter of law. Additionally,
present medical research indicates that a negative HIV test six
months after exposure virtually eliminates the likelihood that such
exposure will result in the future development of AIDS.'7 7 Thus,
171 Id. at *6 (Highers, J., dissenting).
172 Id. Judge Highers stated that under the majority's interpretation of Laxton, "[a]ll
exposure to a known danger, of course, could be described as 'potentially harmful.'" Id.
173 Id. But see Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 451-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1993),
where it was held that the fear of contracting AIDS could form the basis of a cause of action
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) though both exposure was uncertain
and the plaintiff had tested HIV-negative. Marchica involved an employee of the Long Is-
land Rail Road who was stuck with a hypodermic needle as he attempted to clear away
some debris. Id. at 446. In rejecting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court relied on the "broad remedial purpose of FELA and its liberal construction." Id. at
452. The court rejected the defendant's argument that "an injured party can not recover on
a claim of fear of contracting a disease, including AIDS, where the plaintiff had not shown
that he was exposed to the disease." Id. at 447-48. Noting that there is a different standard
of negligence under FELA, the court distinguished this case from Burk on the sole ground
that the claim here was brought under the statute. Id. at 452-53.
174 Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (noting, but
not relying on, plaintiff's HIV testing); Carroll, 1992 VL 276717, at *2 (same).
175 See Petri v. Bank of New York Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1992). The Supreme
Court of New York County had another chance to rule on this issue. Id. However, unlike
Castro, exposure was clearly established, so the grounds for what may constitute exposure
were never addressed. Id. at 613.
176 747 F. Supp. at 285.
'" See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1989 SEXU-
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HIV testing should also be a critical factor in a court's assessment
of whether a claim for AIDS phobia may proceed. A six-month pe-
riod is suggested, after which, assuming negative results, fear of
contracting AIDS would not be reasonable. 78 This standard should
remain flexible; if it is determined that this six-month period is
either too short or long, the standard should be adjusted
accordingly.
ALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES TREATMENT GUIDELINES 1, in AIDS and HIV Infection in the
General STD Setting, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 5-8 (Sept. 1, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter AIDS and HIV] (stating that HIV test should be repeated three and six months after
exposure to rule out infection); Steven Findlay, Speedier New Tests for the AIDS Virus,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 28, 1988, at 79 (reporting that current tests take up to six
months from exposure to detect HIV). The time between infection and the development of
antibodies is called the window period, and though it may last up to six months, it usually
falls somewhere between 6 to 14 weeks. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 100, § 1:30; see
also BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 283 (stating approximately one half of
infected people will test positive for antibodies within six weeks, most will test positive
within three months, and some people will not test positive for longer periods, possibly up
to three years); DOUGLAS & PINSKY, supra note 136, at 45 (explaining that antibodies to HIV
are generally detectable fourteen weeks after infection, but in some cases it takes six to
fourteen months or longer); AIDS and HIV, supra, at 1 (stating that antibodies are usually
detectable within three months of exposure, but test should be repeated six months after as
well); Sloand et al., supra note 136, at 2861 (stating that antibodies to HIV normally de-
velop six to eight weeks after infection). Though some sources seem to indicate that it may
possibly take longer than six months for antibodies to HIV to develop, the majority rely on
studies in which researchers have been able to detect the HIV virus before the development
of antibodies has begun, by means of a test called the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). See
David T. Imagawa et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infection in Homosexual
Men Who Remain Seronegative for Prolonged Periods, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1458 (1989).
Despite such findings, researchers have questioned the reliability of these tests because of
the high false-positive rate and the inability to achieve consistent results. See Sloand et al.,
supra note 136, at 2862. However, other researchers believe that the number of false nega-
tive results is extremely low. Id.
In addition, during the early period of infection, before antibodies to HIV are produced,
the likelihood that a negative test result for antibodies is false is "vanishingly small". See
BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 283. For blood donors in general, only one in
40,000 or 200,000 will falsely test negative. Id. Further, the likelihood that a positive test
result will be false is also "vanishingly small". Id. These figures make the HIV antibody test
one of the most accurate tests in medicine. Id. It is wisest to simply have the test repeated if
there are any serious doubts. Id. In the rare situation when, after repeated tests, an individ-
ual still has questions, it may be wise to take one of the newer tests that detects the virus
itself and therefore avoid the problem posed by the window period. Id.; HERMANN & SCHUR-
GIN, supra note 100, § 1:34; Findlay, supra, at 79. The false-negative problem (indicating
infected blood as healthy) is a relatively minor problem, and the tests are more than 99%
accurate when properly performed on people likely to be exposed to the virus. See Science
Brief, supra note 136, at 71.
'18 See supra note 177. A six-month period is suggested because it appears to reflect the
consensus in the medical community of how long a person may in fact be infected with the
virus, without testing positive on a HIV test. Id.
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Finally, to mitigate the harshness of this standard it is pro-
posed that a plaintiff who can prove exposure but tests negative
for HIV should be permitted to recover for the emotional distress
suffered during the six-month period in which the HIV tests were
inconclusive.17 9 Contrary to Johnson, in which the plaintiff re-
ceived damages for the emotional distress he suffered for years af-
ter the exposure i80 even though he consistently tested HIV-nega-
tive,' 8 a limitation such as this is not only more equitable, but is
also consistent with existing medical knowledge."8 2 One recent case
has already applied a similar restriction.'8" This could be applied
uniformly in every jurisdiction, regardless of how it defines reason-
able fear. 84 From jurisdictions that permit recovery where the pos-
sibility of contracting the future disease is slim, 8 5 to those that
require a high likelihood of development,8 8 a negative HIV test
result six months after the alleged incident would serve to remove
virtually all likelihood of developing AIDS due to the exposure. 17
An HIV-negative test result would break the causal connection
normally required between the exposure and the plaintiff's fear. 88
On the other hand, an HIV-positive test result by the plaintiff
should suffice as conclusive evidence that the plaintiff's fear is rea-
sonable. Empirical evidence suggests that approximately one half
of the people infected with HIV will develop AIDS within eight to
ten years after infection. 189 Accordingly, if a plaintiff can establish
171 Cf. John P. Darby, Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of The AIDS Virus:
Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 197 (1988)
(asserting that HIV-negative plaintiff should be able to recover for fourteen-month period
after exposure).
"I Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d at 891.
181 Id.
182 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (stating that six-month period is
considered adequate to detect HIV).
"'I See Faya v. Estate of Almaraz, Nos. 143, 144, 1993 WL 60500, at *9 (Md. Mar. 9,
1993), where the Maryland Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' recovery for the fear of
contracting AIDS was limited to "the period constituting [plaintiffs'] reasonable window of
anxiety-the period between which they learned of [possible exposure to the virus] and
received their HIV-negative results." Although the plaintiffs in Faya did not learn of their
HIV-negative status until more than one year after the alleged exposure, the court did take
judicial notice of the fact that "at least 95% of HIV carriers will test positive for the virus
(though not manifest AIDS) within six months of acquiring it." Id. at *5.
See infra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 177.
28 See supra note 84 (citing cases where significant causal link was required).
18 BARTLErr & FINKBEINER, supra note 100, at 9. Once stricken with AIDS, an individ-
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that he is HIV infected, he can thereby prove that his chances of
developing AIDS are significant. 190 From jurisdictions that require
a high likelihood of developing the future condition, 191 to those
that do not,192 an HIV-positive test result for the plaintiff should
suffice to indicate the probability of eventually developing AIDS. 93
In addition, a positive HIV test result clearly serves as a "medi-
cally identifiable effect"' 94 to provide the court with concrete evi-
dence of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear. 95 Finally, such a
ual will live one year or longer. Id. However, due to current medical treatments, people with
AIDS live much longer than they once did. Id. Further, the time between initial infection
with HIV and development of AIDS has increased. Id.; see also AIDS and HIV, supra note
177, at 1 (predicting that some HIV victims will take over ten years to develop AIDS). In
one study, AIDS developed in 48% of gay men sometime within ten years after infection,
but additional AIDS cases are expected to arise after this ten year period. Id.
" See AIDS and HIV, supra note 177, at 1.
19 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 189 (stating that one medical report finds it statistically probable
that HIV infection results in AIDS).
19. See supra note 92 (citing cases where "medically identifiable event" was required
for recovery on fear of disease claim).
195 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text; see also Stephanie B. Goldberg,
AIDS Phobia: Reasonable Fears or Unreasonable Lawsuits?, 78 A.B.A. J., June 1992, at 88.
Three facts make the Johnson case troubling:
1) According to a 1989 Centers for Disease Control report, 95 percent of those
contracting HIV will "seroconvert" or develop antibodies in the first six months.
The CDC has stated that is "extremely unlikely" that seroconversion will occur
more than a year after exposure.
2) The CDC has found no documented cases of AIDS transmission through biting
or saliva, says Dr. Lyle Peterson, chief of the HIV Population Study Section.
3) The plaintiff was awarded $1.9 million for his "reasonable fear" of contracting
AIDS.
Id. The Johnson decision is "'unfortunate from a public policy standpoint. Why cater to
people with serious misconceptions about how the disease is transmitted?'" Id. (quoting
insurance defense lawyer Rita M. Theisen, member of ABA coordinating committee).
"'There's clearly an element of unreasonableness when virtually every medical authority is
willing to testify that AIDS is not spread by biting.'" Id. (quoting Michele Zavos, staff
director for ABA's Coordinating Committee on AIDS). AIDS activists, alarmed by AIDS
phobia suits, claim such cases "reinforce myths about how AIDS is spread." Id. In addition
to the public phobic response to AIDS, "[t]he judiciary has been lax about educating itself
about the facts and science of AIDS." Id. (quoting Carisa Cunningham, spokesperson for
Washington D.C.-based AIDS Action Council); see also Susan Adams, Money for Fear, Why
a Jury Awarded $21.75 Million to Rock Hudson's Lover, AM. LAW., July 1989, at 136. In
1985, Marc Christian, lover of the late Rock Hudson, sued Hudson's estate and Hudson's
secretary for the emotional distress Christian allegedly suffered over his fear of contracting
AIDS. Id. Christian's fear arose from Hudson's failure to warn Christian that Hudson had
AIDS. Id. A Los Angeles superior court jury awarded Christian $21.75 million in damages,
more than half of which was to compensate Christian for his alleged emotional distress. Id.
This was despite the fact that Christian had tested negative for HIV sixteen times in the
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standard would advance the policy goals sought to be furthered by
disease-phobia suits: deterring irresponsible behavior, and compen-
sating victims for the period in which the uncertainty and fear rea-
sonably persist.196
CONCLUSION
AIDS has become a world-wide epidemic 9 ' creating much fear
and uncertainty. Our judges must not permit this AIDS hysteria to
overwhelm the courtroom. 98 A jury must be moved by reason
rather than by fear. 99 It is conceded that the strict guidelines sug-
gested may stir disagreement in the legal community. It is never-
theless imperative that the courts begin to redirect their attention
to the crucial issues by focusing on the medical facts of this disease
rather than society's fears or passions.
Debbie E. Lanin
four years that had passed since he and Hudson last had sex. Id. In addition, Christian had
tested negative in "the sophisticated viral culture tests with activators that experts believe
to be 100 percent reliable." Id. Following the verdict, Judge Geernaert ruled that the jury
"had been affected by 'passion,'" and reduced this award to $5.5 million, $5 million of
which constituted compensatory damages. Id. Witnesses for the defense included two lead-
ing AIDS researchers who testified that Christian's negative test results in 1985 were "re-
garded as at least 95 percent accurate and that if a five percent possibility had so distressed
Christian, there was more sophisticated testing available." Id. Questioning how such a
healthy person won such a case, the author stated that "the answer seems to lie in the
public's, and the jury's, pervasive fear of AIDS ... the juror so readily imputed to Christian
their [sic] own anxiety about AIDS that Rhoden [Christian's attorney] was able to rely on
his client's emotional appeal and little else." Id.
"8 See Goldberg, supra note 195.
"7 See generally HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 100, § 1:03 (stating that AIDS has
been reported in 136 countries and territories).
18 Abby Rubenfeld, People with AIDS or HIV-Infection as Plaintiffs in Tort Cases, in
AIDS AND THE COURTS 319, 320 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990).
19 Id. at 321-322.

